

Affektenlehre and protreptic

About the Mental States, Moods, Emotions and Affects regarding their character and their function in Protreptic

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Protreptic is the classical Greek art of assisting another human being in turning his mind towards his core values and towards his sense of self through philosophical and rhetorical dialogue. It is closely related to the Greek philosophical principle of “epimeleia heautou”, “to take care of oneself” in an ethical sense. Protreptic was practiced in the executive educational programs at that time directed towards top leaders with the aim of guiding them in controlling their passions morally for the sake of the commonwealth. Later it had enormous influence as the basis of advising, counseling and mentoring the powerful ruler. During the rise of democracies in the nineteenth century it died away, since the monarch could be controlled with other means than his own moral. Recently it has been revived by the author as a new way of preparing leaders for their task and creating dialogical culture in the organization.

The method of protreptic

This article states that the method of protreptic, today used with leaders and organizations to make values real through philosophical dialogues, can be enriched by “die Affektenlehre” in Baroque music, because it is developed to influence, produce, shape and control the passions and emotions on the basis of rhetoric knowledge. Since protreptic seeks the basic moods of individuals, underlying their attitudes towards life, it can be inspired by the capacity of music to accomplish a contact with these moods and their related emotions and forms of thought.

From Jewish religion and philosophy to Greek theory of thinking and language the phenomenon of voice played a central part. The natural question “What is voice?” was answered in the Hebraic bible by the word “qôl”, meaning both sound in general as found all over nature and the voice of God. The triple sense of sound in Greek, “psófos” (sound, noise, “echos” (echo) and “phoné” (voice”) is also found in the Books of Moses, because Jewish theology distinguished between the Voice of God as flowing directly out of the sky, appearing as an echo of this real, transcendent voice, or as the inner voice of man. In this theology, however, the written word, the “Torah”, the law, acquired increasing influence as the incorporation of the voice of God – so Derrida perfectly follows his own Jewish roots in developing his famous philosophy of the ontological and epistemological sovereignty of the written word over the spoken.

Plato sometimes use “psófos” and “phoné” synonymic, even if the Greek legacy takes the former as the genus and the latter as the species - his contemporary the Pythagorean Archytas, was the first one to speak about “phoné” as the “voice of an instrument” – and focuses far more than the Jewish tradition on the relation of sense and thinking (dianoia) to voice, and thought as incorporated in external and internal speech, the later so famous Stoic distinction between “logos prophoricos” and “logos endiáthetos” (external and internal speech). Aristotle begins to develop a more syntactical perspective faithful to his empiric approach, emphasizing the form of language “lexis”, “the word, “onoma”, and the phenomenon of referential sense (semantikos) and sense in general (“logos) making the demarcation between humans and animals, because of the “kata synthéken”, the symbolic and hence, artificial-historical character of language.

To protreptic the distinction of Plato between the outer and the inner voice is of enormous importance, because the conversations serve the purpose to form new “styles” and subjects of inner speech. He also defines thinking as inner dialogue, the conversation of the soul with itself.

To sum up, “voice” was transferred by Aristotle to music and used metaphorically in this way ever since, but musical metaphors were already used by Plato when he speaks of the harmony of the soul, rather close at hand, since the savage struggle between the passions, the ratio and the will is often felt as inner agitation and uneasiness possible to experience as “noise”, as a cacophony. Against this the harmony, the pure line of melody, or even the “logon zema” from Timaios 20C, “the feast of words” as known by the Greeks in the theatre, but by us in the great works for chorus and orchestra since the Baroque, can appear as its contrast, together with the “aposiopesis”, the enforced silence of speech from rhetoric, in music the general pause expressing the affective states of dying, sleeping or being silent. Even the murmur, so close to psófos as noise – and to what the Stoic named “skindapsos”, human word without sense – can be transformed by beauty in music as in the motet, meaning "a choral composition on a sacred text", originating from late 14c., coming from O.Fr. motet (13c.) which was originally a diminutive of "mot" "word," from Latin mutum "grunt, murmur." As well as in the madrigal, the word coming from Latin “marix” meaning “womb” – the silence of the womb which Yeats used as a poetical expression, but which new research proves is not correct, since the embryo seems to listen and that it early gets both a sense of the spoken idiom and is able to profit from music.

In the Jewish-Greek tradition another perspective of voice was stroke which proved important to the Enlightenment, especially to Goethe, and very later to Heidegger, the latter calling thinking the “listening which sees” in the big essay “Der Satz vom Grund”. He here indirectly quotes Philo from Alexandria who in the time around the birth of Christ tried to combine the Greek schools with Jewish philosophy. Philo conceives the words from the Decalogue as an appearance of light, not as the result of a real voice, which “the eye of the soul” is able to perceive, because the eye itself

consists essentially of the same light in its likeness to the visualizing power of Gods thinking.

Now, music might also be conceived as a type of light since the deep passions own an intensity which is felt in the body as a spectral force and purring presence – the Eastern theories of the chakras testify to that. From this perspective words also are seen as carriers of light, since they are able to “enlighten” the mind through the power of logos and this is the core of the good rhetoric coming close to theurgy, white, benevolent magic. Leibniz' famous term "fulguratio", lightning is a principle of God's perpetual creative activity in the "monads".

At its very best protreptic is an objective, profane and deep ethical kind of theurgy, and the ritual core of conversation is conjured up by the likeness of a successful protreptic session to a duet or a quartet following an unknown score of mind and the ultra-harmonic mood of co-compassion.

1. Introduction to die Affektenlehre

Protreptic has the task to conjure up a clearer image and conception of the other's awareness and feeling of self. It also has to connect the propinquity and capacity to reflect to a pronounced sense of freedom – a sense which must be nurtured as the ability to transgress the limits of passions and emotions into a mood of virtual liberation – I guess that Nietzsche would have been inclined to call such mood “the lofty and cool spirit of mountain-air”. To meet this challenge the so called “Affektenlehre” from Baroque Music, so thoroughly inspired by rhetoric, can be of great assistance. It is of great importance to remember that the beginning of the monument of rhetorical theory, Aristotle's “Rhetoric”, sets off from the phrase “Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic”, thus combining what Plato and later on Petrus Ramus (forming Protestant rhetoric) did separate. In my “principle of translocutionarity” I draw the full consequence of the conceptual influence of the “linguistic turn” – the principle says “I do not know what I myself mean, until I hear myself speaking”. This principle is, in spite of his criticism of Sophism pertinent to the thought of Plato, since he defines thinking as an inner dialogue and a war with oneself (e.g. in “Theaitetos” and in “Laws”). However, we must, I think, be forced to admit that thinking is not just extremely dependent on the word, but also on emotion - as a concept covering the whole range of intensity- types from passions, via inner and outer affects, to moods and incorporated values (Dewey and the Phenomenological movement emphasized that, to mention some out of many). However, this insight gives music more than an analogical status with the side of rhetoric directed to creating impressions, emotions, believes and being convinced or taken by surprise by persuasion verging towards manipulation. Understanding at all levels, but especially “real” or “deep” understanding, cannot be built on logic alone (i.e. on skeptical and “antiseptic” argument), but need emotion and its more comprehensive mood.

In this sense “affect” is a misplaced word, if we follow Kant’s canonical distinction between affect and passion, but the use of the word during the Baroque did not have the connotation of the short, vehement, whim like and unwillingly or without precedence attacking, vehement and blurred, awareness, in which the individual or group are being caught or trapped by overwhelming feelings

- Kant thought that passion was far more based in personality and hence, Affect and will are not opposites in Baroque music, as affect is perfectly able to be in harmony with thought and to deepen and consolidate its logical (i.e. the deep, uncompromising, sharp and clear contributions by intellect and reason, nous/logos, intellectus/ratio) aspects. In that sense music is still in line with the scholastic pre-Ramon rhetoric, even if religious music might oppose belief and rational thought
- today we are slowly discovering the cognitive and conative powers of music, the latter being earlier mostly known to military practice (the drums and pipes hypnosis).

That music is not to a great degree liable to this temptation (of music as a sheer matter of emotion) can be seen in the concept of “invention”, the first of the five canonical stages of rhetoric composition. Firstly, invention aims towards deriving heuristic procedures or systematic strategies that will aid students in discovering and generating ideas about which they might write, i.e. it relies on the possibility of - which was named much later - “a logic of discovery”, and hence leans towards analytical thought and its logic. Secondly, invention is conceived as a way in which speakers, writers and composers establish “voice” in writing, speaking and composing, plus realize individual style and hence, fingerprints of identity. In other words, aesthetics is a means to “episteme”, to knowledge. To object that knowledge is a subjective matter would be a *contradictio in adjecto*. But this must not be interpreted as a legitimization of “self-construction”, an ambiguous, but morally and ethically infestation with desires for power, status and lack of real care for other people. As such it is banished from protreptic. “*Epimelia heautu*” (*cura sui*) is accepted, but certainly not “*philautia*” (complacency).

In the 17th. and 18th. Century the Affektenlehre is represented by theoretical writings of which the most influential authors are Michael Praetorius (*Syntagma musicum*, 1619), Marin Mersenne (*Harmonie universelle*, 1636), Athanasius Kircher (*Murgia universalis*, 1650), and above all Johann Mattheson (*Der vollkommene Kapellmeister*, 1739). A systematic, canonical synthesis was produced by Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg (1718–1795). The most analyzed composer in regard to the Affektenlehre is Johann Sebastian Bach.

The canonical author on this subject (die Affektenlehre) is still Johann Mattheson with the famous book “*Der vollkommene Kapellmeister*”, from 1739 [1], and “*Kern melodischer*

Wissenschaft" from 1737 [2]. Here the instrumental music is accepted for real as a media to create emotions on the same level as song. However, the focus on music without words needs not distract the focus from the verbal art of protreptic. Analogies can safely be drawn, also beyond level, rhythm, intonation, phrasing and expressing in the voice, into a realm in which words are able to work as tones, chords, and melodies.

We can well speak about a conversation having its pitch and melody, and the way in which practicing speaking, and our capacity to pay attention to the sound of our own voice shifting from situation to situation are all phenomena legitimating musical analogies. One important question by the protreptic guide (the one guiding the conversations from the perspective of protreptic) is, after all, "What does that which you would call your own voice mean and in which situations do you're here it?" or the inverse: "Have you noticed how, when and why the sound of your own voice shifts from situation to situation?"

To the musician the question of the sound of his very own sound on his instrument could probably be answered by a reference to the event in which it has sounded the best? Or is it when he practices alone?

Kant finally brought the confusion of the sense of "affect" to a standstill in his "Anthropology" by distinguishing between passion and affect, the former being permanent based in the character and hence, a possible subject of deliberation and even choice; the latter being temporary and without ratio. In this book he also finished the theory of temperament, the one cornerstone on which "die Affektenlehre" in music was built. The other one was moral qualities.

Before the renaissance the physical aspects of the theories of temperament dominated since it originated in Hippokrates and Galen (130-199 AD.), Greek masters of medicine, of which the latter totally ruled over medicine far into the Baroque. Galen, however, did not draw so strong consequences of his use of Empedocles' and Aristotle's theories of the four physical temperaments what concerns a characterology as did Vindicianus in his educational letter from the fourth century AD. On this the Scholastic built their theory of personality. A privileged place is here hold by the famous speculations of the melancholic temperament anticipated by the so called Pseudo- Aristotelean "Problema", XXX, 1., in which among others Plato is mentioned as the prototype of the manio-depressive genius. The Renaissance philosopher, Ficino, vindicated the melancholic as the man of "virtú" of his age, combining erudition and creativity with demonic sides too. During the Baroque and the Enlightenment the relations between the temperaments and the character became more differentiated and complex, allowing for mixtures and ideals of "eucrasia", Galen's Greek word for the ideal of a balanced body-mind. However, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that medicine became totally liberated from the theories of temperament.

In philosophy Francis Bacon in the beginning of the seventeenth century already spoke about

the “undifferentiated nature” of man, a perspective destroyed by modern science until recently and still rather influent in this mutilated form as the ideal of conceiving the body as an isolated subject of research in medicine, prevailing even in neurobiology, especially now with the tempting deterministic context suggested by the discovering of the genes.

As mentioned Kant’s restriction of the temperaments to count for the two parts of the Platonic chariot of the soul, the will to live and the desire, but not for the coachman, the ratio; and his restriction of the temperaments to refer to emotions and actions only, and not to reflectivity; destroyed the theory of temperament as the basis of a characterology. However, his dependence on the good will of man in regard to his moral theory clings to a theory of mood.

The conceptual framework of “die Affektenlehre” became dependent on both the theory of temperaments and on the revival of the scholastic framework of virtues and vices by the attempt at a pseudomechanistic psychology by Descartes (and his pupil Mersenne). In “Les passions de l’âme”, a book which in many ways had catastrophic consequences, because it blocked the understanding of the body as a dynamic, interactive and experience-creating way of being (Not until Edmunds Husserl’s first, rudimentary attempt at pointing to this Cartesian catastrophe for European thinking in his late “Cartesianische Meditationen” was the incorporatedness and situatedness of the body really posited as an epistemological alternative). Descartes pupil Mersenne who developed a musical theory on these lines, and who even came close to a modern definition of pitch, had a rather dominating influence on the understanding of the affects in Baroque music. Their legacy implied that the body is a reception-machine and that music has to create impressions which determine certain emotions. These must have an objective basis, even if they are interpreted differently by each subject – a figure of thinking surviving as late as in Gilbert Ryle’s book “The Concept of Mind” from 1949. In this linguistic analysis made him conclude that there exist objective moods versus private emotions, a thinking which might at the first glance seem rather sensible, perhaps best through O. F. Bollnow’s theories of the moods in “Neue Geborgenheit” from 1959 and which, by taking due consideration of the slightly angled perspective, could be seen as one of the central messages of Heidegger’s “Sein und Zeit” from 1928. This conclusion answers to the schema used by Baroque composers and musical theorists like Mathesson.

In protreptic such objective moods are related to values and given a specific ontological and epistemological basis. Moods are hints to the real signification of the individual values in our lives. Following Descartes and Mersenne the composer had in his power the capacity to enforce one and only one effect on the mind of the audience. This could be summarized in laws of the effects of resonance built on the width of intervals. As it became canonical in harmonics during the Baroque, it was thought that the further the interval was from the unison, the more the mind was affected vehemently through a speeding up of the spirits of the soul. This also goes for the

deviation from the octave, the fifth and the major triad. The tempi, time and beat which enforces the spirits according to speed, are controlled by the same principles [3].

As still in psychology today pleasure-pain and happiness-sorrow are the basic building stones of the affects they are by Descartes enriched by moral concepts of religious basis and by the scholastic distinction between bad and good passions. René Descartes (1596-1650) made the distinction between six affects (passions): admiration, amour, haine, désir, joie and tristesse. He collected these from the Thomistic canon of affects from the twelfth century, but detailed and refined it. This schema of affects were directly used in the „Theatrum affectuum humanorum“ (1717) written by the Jesuit Franz Lang. He used the eleven scholastic affects: Ira (anger), fuga (flight), timor (fear), odium (hate), tristitia (sadness), desperation (desperation), desiderium (desire), audacia (audacity), amor (love), gaudium (happiness), spes (hope) [4].

Mathesson constructs his list of affects on this basis supplying with pride, humility, obstinacy, eagerness and revenge. As the theory of temperaments generally taught, Mathesson also operated with mixed affects constructed from basic passions (Marpurg did the same). Thus jealousy is seen as a combination of love, suspicion, desire, revenge, sadness, fear and shame. After all, this is not bad psychology. Following the theory of rhetoric Mathesson thought that both the composer and the performer should know and feel the affect which was to be transferred to the audience in his own mind. Like in the “Poetics” of Aristotle, recognition thus was an important epistemo-aesthetic concept.

This is easier to understand if we contemplate that music was seen as a “parainesis”, as a way to admonish to seriousness and moral zealousness in relation to one’s own life – after all we are in rather stern Protestant, German environments with islands of Puritanism. It was a door into the basic moral feelings. This door opened what since Aristotle’s “Poetics” has been known as “catharsis”, a much debated concept which as one sense has the purification of painful and morally bad feelings and passions by co-enacting them with the people on the stage. Being absorbed in the predicaments of the heroes and heroines, finding oneself totally captured by their fate, made the entrance into a morally purer mindset possible.

Theoretically such effects could be defended by the Pythagorean heritage with its theories of music and number. The musical movement, its oscillation, tension and relief were supplanted automatically to the mind through reign of the same proportions of number – subjects addressed by Descartes.

Protreptic has no moralizing intentions, unless the task to insist that the other person takes her own life seriously is seen as a moral issue. In my version protreptic is not bound to any moral prescriptions, but to an ethics in the original sense of the word’s Greek roots. “Ethos” originally means “habitat” in Homer, but in Plato and his followers it is used in two versions, one with “eta”

(long “e”), meaning character, genetic constitution, values incubated during the first and second socialization; and one with “epsilon” (the short “e”) correlative to “hexis” (by Cicero translated into “habitus”), meaning habit as a positive power to transform yourself in the image of values and by exploring your talent for social communication, your sense of the event, and your ethical fantasy. Personal ethic combines the two dimensions of ethos in a positive spiral movement driven by awe for the mutual core values and by the will to honor one-self by doing the good for the good’s own sake.

In so far as values must be something which is able to be shared, because they constitute the organic life principle of a community, the moods answering to these values - moods which in their capacity to guide, drive, reject and accept actions are identical to virtues - must be able to be shared too. But these moods are more like fields of attitudes and emotions centered round a value, no two persons would probably ever feel exactly in the same way, although they might act identically down into the slightest detail.

Take the core value justice, common to all societies. The understanding, motives, scope of purpose and the practice related to the creation of laws mirroring the culturally concrete justice should in principle be possible to frame inside a conceptual network of a “diairetic” type (a net with a hierarchic logic, e.g. genus-species, etc.). But the emotions bound up with these practices and cognitive figures might vary a good deal from culture to culture and even from social group to social group. However, the basic moods as the one of merciless and forgiveness, so suggestively described by Shakespeare in “The Merchant of Venice”, shall always form the fundamental “keys” related to this value. Much more violence, vehemence, cruelty and lack of humanity can be released in relation to the core value justice than to the core value “the good”, however, not necessarily more intensity and devotion.

In ethical matters there must be basic moods, considering the mentioned reservations, and hence, there must be both false moods and feigned emotions. This is very important, because a false mood must either be a mood which reveals itself through negative sentiments like angst, despair, depression, sadness, anger, etc.; or a mood which is merged with complacency. Of course happiness can be a false mood, but this is a delicate matter, since only the person feeling it would be able to judge. The protreptic guide does not look for life-lies in Ibsen’s sense. He only looks for inconsistencies between stated values and expressed and articulated moods – he must always be extremely careful not to believe too much in his own capacity to read behind the lines.

To stick to the analogy with the Affektenlehre here, we must accept that just like composer and performer can expect that the basic affects they feel are shared by the musicians and by the audience, the protreptic guide can expect that the other person has the ability to experience values, basic moods and emotions in the same way as him. But he cannot, of course, reckon with some causal mechanism which makes words for values and moods automatically produce

attitudes and feelings of a certain kind – unless he operates within the perverted thought-universe of Descartes and Mersenne. That is why he must invite the other person to analyze the meaning of a word which refers to a relevant concept or value. During this process he might be properly informed about the other person's state of mind.

2. Salient traits of die Affektenlehre

Theorists shared the idea that music had a pronounced moral effect since it strengthened the basic attitudes and emotions of virtue and weakened the vices. On the one hand it automatically produced sympathetic sentiments and on the other hand it implied a catharsis from the negative attitudes and emotions. Mattheson went so far that he named music a practice of moral self-control ("Zuchtlehre") – standing here as far from the universe of Plato as possible.

"Zwar ist es an dem, daß diejenigen unter der Affecten, welche uns von Natur am meisten anhangen, nicht die besten sind, und allerdings beschnitten oder im Zügel gehalten werden müssen. Das ist ein Stück Sittenlehre, die ein vollkommener Ton-Meister auf alle Weise inne haben muß, will er anders Tugenden und Laster mit seinen Klängen wol vorstellen, und dem Gemüthe des Zuhörers die Liebe zu jenen, und den Abscheu vor diesen geschickt einflößen. Denn das ist die rechte Eigenschafft der Music, daß sie eine Zucht-Lehre vor andern sey." [5]

The contemplative effect of music formed a natural inclination to confront "the inner human being" as developed by Augustine and Luther. This was in the Affektenlehre expressed as the key of mind or the basic tonality of character.

That especially the opera had a vehement emotional effect on the audience is well documented from contemporary sources, but instrumental music never reached this level of conjuring up direct outbursts of emotion. However, Johann Joachim Quantz "Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte traversière zu spielen" von 1752 wrote about the flute player that his play was able to impress the mind to a considerable degree and that the greatest beauty of the cadences consisted in:

"... daß sie als etwas unerwartetes den Zuhörer in eine neue und rührende Verwunderung setzen, und die gesuchte Erregung der Leidenschaften gleichsam aufs höchste treiben sollen." [6]

But even by Quantz, being rather isolated in this focus on the performance-powers of the artist, and writing already at the ground of the Rococo, the moral purpose of music still prevails. Passion is never experienced for passion's sake.

Mattheson emphasizes that rhetoric and music have the same aim, and that writing a speech and composing a piece share many procedures. Also what concerns phrasing parallels between language and music could be found. Mattheson describes a hierarchic model of phrasing by hand

of grammatical concepts like period, comma, and exclamation sign. His famous concept „sound-speech“ (die Klangrede) testifies to this.

To Mattheson music is not just to be seen as a means to make a textual content more pronounced or clear, but it has its own inner level and force of significance. Thus the content of music cannot be conceived as linguistic, i.e. music does not represent in relation to a code of signs and the designated built on virtual disambiguation, but its overall structure and relation to significance are close to language. Mattheson thus advocates the autonomy of the musical medium.

3. Rhetoric and Music

As already mentioned music was seen in analogy with rhetoric in which persuasion was used with a moral-ethical and edifying purpose. The alluring power of music was more seen as a means to convince, not to seduce. This must mean that the audience knew very well the moral values of the different emotions conjured by music. The idea was neither the one known from classicism and onwards to explore one's own emotional subjectivity, nor was it to create new emotional experiences in the audience, but to intensify and deepen existing ones (Quantz is, as just mentioned, the first to underline the influence pouring from the musician as an interpreter).

So Mattheson closely follows the canonical rhetorical doctrine of creating when he describes the activity of the composer in the rhetorical terms as: invention, disposition and elaboration involving *decoratio*. Inspiration, however, was not seen as the product of individual genius but more as the capacity of the artisan. The composer must have a certain measure of detachedness, reflectivity and a deep knowledge of all canonical forms of musical expression. As far as music as an art had a sacred purpose, it was able to serve faith, and although the Greek, religious sentiment did differ from the Christian, both the ethical and purification function of Aristotle's ritualized theatre can be found in Baroque-music – even in the profane opera. This means that the Greek opposition between *episteme* and *techne* is still influent during the 17th century, but when religion comes under influence of the enlightenment, it mutates with the other cultural phenomena into a new version of *phronesis*, of practical, ethical knowledge, which does not any longer separate knowledge and art with the same rigor as the Greek mindset. During the Romantic period, and later, a totally new movement comes to be in which art conquers knowledge. Mendelsohn expresses this in his famous dictum that music is too precise a language to be expressed in words.

During the Baroque the knowledge of the central tools of the musician in order to influence the listener's mind was very consciously and carefully developed. These tools were key (mode), time and rhythm, intervals and figures. They answered closely to the tools of rhetoric, although the common parameters of course acquired different weight and an own elaboration when

transferred to music. Rhetoric could not develop keys, time and rhythm to the same importance and differentiation as seen in music, although figures of speech could be used to far more than the same degree; and music could not create intervals of sense and significance to the same degree as found in speech. Following Albert Schweitzer, writing about Bach's *musica poetica* in the chorals:

"Bach knows a double expression of pain. To present the noble complaint he uses a sequence of bound notes, connected in pairs; the terrific pain he depicts through a chromatic motive of five and six notes." [7]

In rhetoric this answers to the movements of speech named *Pathopoeia* (Greek *pathos*, suffering, gr. *poiesis*, formation): Tones foreign to the scale intensify affects. For example: *Passus duriusculus*, a chromatic line moving either upwards or downwards by fifths (known as "lament-bass" or *Lamento*), unusual steps (major second), or *Saltus duriusculus*, a big, mostly falling leap (reduced fourth, reduced fifth, minor septime, which represents deception).

We must admit that even supplied with key, movement, modulation, etc., this is a poor set of instruments compared to language – I mean, to underline the emotion in the text of the choral our vocal modulations, intonations and gestures are far superior, because we can refer to a shared understanding of the communicative situation (often partly "tacit", too) to which music has no access due to among others the whole setting of performance. Even a single man with a guitar in friends' company will be limited in his capacity to express by the very lyrics and music which he might use, what he could discursively explain. Understatement (not feigned and aesthetic but real) and the lack of will or capacity to express oneself, AND self-reflection in relation to communicative situation, does not belong to the realm of music. Figures were simply transferred from rhetoric with natural differences like grace notes and trills – often trills, like in Tartini's late Baroque style degenerated into mere decoration and mannerism. The moods dwelling in Tartini's music for violin solo or in his famous "Devil's trill sonata" is a strange mixture of sadness, piety, and triumph of sensuality. It is hard to come by, to my opinion, and might be misjudged due to the years elapsed, just like the mood of the e-major due to the change in level of pitch. Key was in die *Affektenlehre* conceived inside a strict representational system, in which sentiments and keys were unambiguously related in two parallel series.

Keys based on the major third represented (i.e. produced) happiness. Keys based on the minor third effectuated sadness. The distinction between the gay major keys and the depressing minor keys were canonical. Mattheson substituted this with a far more differentiated description of each accepted key. An apt composer could always find the proper key for the emotion or mood he wanted to express. The c-major had a crisp and aggressive character, but could be skillfully applied to encompass a certain elegance and tenderness. C-minor had a lovely, but modified sad effect,

and ought to be combined with a rash and lively beat in order not to prove soporific. D-major, so well fitting to the tuning and hence, techniques, of the violin, had a more intellectual, cherishing, and even martial flavor. D-minor had a meditative, calming, nice and grandiose character which made it very suiting to the church [8].

Bach used e-major and a-minor and d-minor for his violin concertos, and d-minor for his masterpiece for solo violin, the chaconne (I eventually prefer to play this piece, and all the other sonatas and partitas on the viola, having for many years used the violin only for these works, and the viola for the cello suites, and the transcription into g-minor does not alter the chaconne for me.) Technical limitations in musicians and radical strangeness towards uncommon intervals in the audience restricted the use of complicated key signatures. The last and most difficult concerto in the technically progressive "Four Seasons" by Vivaldi has the f-minor, a rather difficult key, especially for the deep stringed instruments. However, since the raise of the chamber tone during the last 300 years there might be differences in the emotional character of keys [9]. Key seems obviously to be the musical phenomenon besides the other four media, time and rhythm, intervals and figures, which comes closest to the concept of mood, although time and intervals also clearly have a bearing on the emotions.

4 Figures

There are more than one and a half hundred rhetorical figures and many of them were transferred to music during the Baroque, most of them coming from the Roman rhetorician Quintilian. The purpose of their transposition into music was not just decoration but the capacity to produce more intense and differentiated affects; and also to keep associations to the character of text during the performance of instrumental music.

Through the use of rhetoric vocabulary in music a terminology of an already existing practice could be created.

One problem posed by theoreticians like Mattheson was whether the single word in a vocal composition should be expressed through musical means, the sky, air, paradise by the high level of tones and darkness, death, etc. by the opposite; or whether the basic affect of the piece should be the centre.

In the protreptic dialogue has the basic mood of the guided person an extreme importance. It is the task of the protreptic guide to help her to recognize this basic mood behind her values. The single words would be points of departure for this exploration since no word used is totally accidental, because there vey often would be another option of phrasing of a thought, an intention, an impression or an attitude.

I shall only mention a few important rhetoric figures here:

Anaphora is in music the repetition of a group of tones or an emphasis. This is, of course, the guiding lines of the protreptic conversation, as far as one or more important words are its theme in the capacity of roads to the values of the person.

Antitheton is the contraposition of two opposing aspects like major and minor. In protreptic the guide could for example ask what sorrow is in the midst of the other person's talk of success.

Dubitatio (Lat. Dubitare): doubting, faltering and hesitating is in music expressed though an uncertain modulation or a staggering. In the dialogue this state contains important information about the other person's relation to a value – as does the opposite, the (too) vivid flow.

Ellipse, also named a feigned ending or a sudden brake from a flow in the discourse of the other person in order to force him to pay attention to a deeper value. As the Apoko or Abruptio it is the unprepared interruption of a melody or a movement.

Homoioteleuton or Homoiototon means a general pause drawing attention to a subject. This is important in any conversation.

Interrogatio is in music a raising melodic figure used to denote a question. Questioning is the soul of protreptic and had to be expressed in a kind, suggestive and confirming voice.

Climax is in protreptic never a conclusion or a summation, but always a dilemma, paradox, or just a question which cannot be answered in this context, but has to be addressed by the guided person in solitude, thus keeping him on the road of inner conversation suggested by the dialogue.

5. Time and rhythm

The drum was probably the first musical instrument and time and beat has ritual purposes betraying their affective force. Pipes and drums were used for drill and trumpets for battle far into the nineteenth century.

Depression is usually slow in mental rhythm and sorrow demands solemn behavior like in the largo. Joy is fast and dance-movements have great importance during the Baroque as expressive means – gigue, etc. which like the gavotte and the bouree is a dance, but in their slower form they can be used for more solemn purposes. Most movements have these institutional and ritual functions like the pavana and the chaconne. Tempi in three and eight parts are joyous, in halves more serious or pompous. The alla breve forced the fluid temperaments. It is not so obvious to transfer time and rhythm to the protreptic dialogue, but words like light, playful, happy, or slow, sluggish, evocative, dull and apathetic, are predicates of conversations.

A very important aspect of the protreptic dialogue is in intensity and that does mean its drive and flow. It has to capture, fascinate, imprison and create strong attention, if it should be able to succeed.

6. Genres and performance

When it comes to instrumental music there cannot be any important difference about the roles classical music and jazz could play respectively as an inspirational reservoir for protreptic. To go into the distinction between vocal music and instrumental music would just complicate the matter, since protreptic is about voices spoken without music. If music could be used in the context of dialogue is another matter and cannot be ruled out.

Instrumentation plays an important part in die Affektenlehre, but can only be used analogically in relation to dialogue and might seem rather far-fetched.

However, after Mattheson and Quantz the difference between vocal and pure instrumental music loses its importance, since the lessons from die Affektenlehre also goes for the latter. However, there are of course differences in degrees, since instrumental music demands greater skill to transfer particular affects and the basic mood of the piece can be more difficult to pre-control. However, as instrumental music develops during the enlightenment moods and emotions are produced which goes beyond the existing vocabulary in language. Thus new moods and new ways of feeling are suggested. Especially Beethoven is a proof of that. Freedom, hope, "pleroma", fulfillment, enthusiasm and autonomy, they are all emotional dimensions of his music, which are experienced as something richer and more precise than words can articulate. The alliance between poetry and music as separate media moving in the same direction is stated by the Romantic Movement.

During the enlightenment the performer, especially the virtuoso and the primadonna acquires a quite new status, belonging to only a few like Buxtehude, J.S. Bach, Vivaldi, and other Italian and French composers, besides some virtuous-composer from the Marburger-school, during the past centuries; and during the nineteenth century we witness an increase in distinction between master performer and composer, a phenomenon liberating the limitations of the Baroque music by the technical capacities of the composer himself (a fact demonstrated in the raise in the inclination to play the viola by composers, Bach, Mozart and Beethoven being the first preferring this instrument among the strings). The raising level of orchestra musicians also plays an important part in giving opportunities to composers. Knowing the small imperfect teams with which Beethoven presented his symphonies his possibilities appear almost incomprehensible in the light of his mastership.

7. Summarizing

The protreptic event and the eventing protreptic

To transfer such deliberations to protreptic has its limitations, of course. However, the use of consonants and vocals, and the intonation of the voice, can be effectively modulated to the sense of other persons and to the situation.

The questions raised by Quantz and Ph.E. Bach whether the performer must feel the emotions which he tries to convey are important to protreptic. It is obvious that the protreptic must know the moods and emotions presented and produced in the dialogue from his experience, but it can neither be claimed that he is, nor that he should be able to, reproduce them authentically and with almost the same intensity.

This is, of course an important question in protreptic and other relevant ones shall be raised by die Affektenlehre, so let us list them.

I.

1. The protreptic guide must try to confront the other with the basic difference between his own good and bad This is done by bringing him to a point at which he meets his own basic values.
2. As music is generally pleasant in spite of its stormy emotional means protreptic must presuppose that the other's intentions are better than he might know and feel himself, if he should proceed along the lines of die
3. The protreptic guide must not just allow the other to live pain, e. to acknowledge his own way of betraying his good values and his own life, but lead him to this by a diligent use of language.
4. The protreptic guide must improvise, he can never plan a conversation, but he must always be detached from the conversation at some level and always master to be outside and inside this event at the same Improvisation is so extremely palpable and obvious in music.
5. He must command a vast reservoir of word-connections, -connotations and –associations, and know their relation to the values by But at the same time he must know that this can never be a process of deduction since every person experiences his peculiar relations between word and values. Thus he could never be a pupil of Descartes and Mersenne, since his ocean of operation is controlled ambiguity.

II.

The questions remain:

1. Must the protreptic know all possible states of mind?
2. Must the protreptic feel the emotions and affects of the other person?
3. Must the protreptic feel the basic mood of the other?
4. Must the protreptic feel the basic mood of the conversation in order to shape/co-shape it?
5. How many and how conflicting and how violent affects are relevant in a protreptic conversation?

Every protreptic guide must develop his own answer, as must the musical virtuous.

III.

1. The emotions and moods conjured up during protreptic are presumed to be well known by the other person, but not necessarily experienced in their relation to, and dependence on, This does not exclude the experience of new moods, but as far as this is interpreted as an aesthetic experience of self-enjoyment, protreptic is not interested in it. There must be no trace of the uncommitted, the unserious, or the undemanding, in protreptic, but humor is gladly accepted as long as it does not exhibit other persons.
2. Of course the protreptic must be able to invent. Actually the conversation pivots around the other's capacity to invent himself once more in the light of values. But invention has a far more delicate or even precarious side, since the protreptic in some sense must have a vital feeling for the other, a sense of his being, which is neither the result of projection nor construction. This is necessary, because the limits of the other is a very sensitive issue, and because the protreptic must sometimes be able to improvise vehemently by risking a question which transgresses the line of defense of the other, or which turns the whole conversation bottom up. This is a matter of judgment on the basis of always all too little information and must be used sparsely and with the utmost
3. Since every conversation has its peculiar key, or its pattern of key-shifting, mirroring the moods of both interlocutors the protreptic must be very aware of The word chosen, what he asks for, the generous interpretation of the other's reflection could mirror a major key, while his sense of a sadness, sorrow, or even desperation in the other demand an acknowledgement in the choice of wording and intonation, and as to the way of asking, which would answer to the minor key. For a long distance of conversation the articulation of being well acquainted with sorrow by the protreptic might be a way to guide the other to the border, where the reign of joy begins. A bold reference to a personal experience of sorrow could be the way which the protreptic could chose to set the level of intimacy of the conversation.

4. There could be found a capacity worthy of much envy in especially instrumental music, its capability to work with such a social discretion towards, or should one say reticence on behalf of, the listener? Words, on the other hand, often betray why and how they are able to produce such violent reactions. This tacit opportunity of minds to find expression and relief is the ideal of the protreptic dialogue, and it is the core of its ethos.

Music caresses the mind through sound, speech must learn to do the same. To merge with the mental state in a soft absorption which mobilizes all the powers of the body and the senses, as well as those of the body-mind, is the force of music and the ideal of speaking.

After all, the core of words is light, and light also comes from the eyes which see the other person. Enlightenment, clarity, purity, the clean mirroring, this is what we owe each other in dialogue, after all. Also, this is the gift of good music. Written and printed words, and notes, are dark on white. Genuine thinking and pure sound are white traces left on darkness.

Notes

1. Faksimile Nachdruck (reproduction) in der ersten Reihe der Documenta Musicologica, hrsg. v. Margarete Reimann, Kassel 1980.
2. Reproduction of the 1737, Edition, Hildesheim/New York 1976
3. The work of Marin Mersenne had an important influence during the Baroque. His *Harmonie universelle* (Paris, 1636/7) is the first theory of music in the Cartesian tradition.
4. To this see *Dammann, Rolf*, *Der Musikbegriff im deutschen Barock*, 2. unv. Aufl. Köln 1984; *Thieme, Ulrich*, *Die Affektenlehre im philosophischen und musikalischen Denken des Barock, Vorgeschichte, Ästhetik, Physiologie*, Celle 1984; *Unger, Hans-Heinrich*, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Musik und Rhetorik im 16. -18. Jahrhundert*, Hildesheim/New York 1979; and *Der Affektbegriff in der Musik des Barock* von Alexa Eicken (the last text is a very good and short introduction to the whole subject).
5. "Der vollkommene Kapellmeister", 1739, Faksimile Nachdruck in der ersten Reihe der Documenta Musicologica, hrsg. v. Margarete Reimann, 1980,, I. Teil, 3. Kap. § 54, S. 15
6. Siehe Quantz, Johann Joachim, *Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte traversière zu spielen*, Reprint der Ausgabe Berlin 1752, Kassel 1992, XV. Hauptstück § 18, S. 157.
7. Albert Schweitzer: *Johan Sebastian Bach*. Wiesbaden: Breitkopf & Härtel 1967. P. 433. My translation from German (ofk)
8. Mattheson, *Von der Musicalischen Tohne Eigenschaft und Würckung in Ausdrückung der Affecten*, 1713.
9. Wikipedia writes: Until the 19th century there was no concerted effort to standardize musical pitch, and the levels across Europe varied widely. Pitches did not just vary from

place to place, or over time—pitch levels could vary even within the same city. The pitch used for an English cathedral organ in the 17th century, for example, could be as much as five semitones lower than that used for a domestic keyboard instrument in the same city. Even within one church, the pitch used could vary over time because of the way organs were tuned. Generally, the end of an organ pipe would be hammered inwards to a cone, or flared outwards, to raise or lower the pitch. When the pipe ends became frayed by this constant process they were all trimmed down, thus raising the overall pitch of the organ. Some idea of the variance in pitches can be gained by examining old pitchpipes, organ pipes and other sources. For example, an English pitchpipe from 1720 plays the A above middle C at 380 Hz, while the organs played by Johann Sebastian Bach in Hamburg, Leipzig and Weimar were pitched at A = 480 Hz, a difference of around four semitones. In other words, the A produced by the 1720 pitchpipe would have been at the same frequency as the F on one of Bach's organs. From the early 18th century, pitch could be also controlled with the use of tuning forks (invented in 1711), although again there was variation. For example, a tuning fork associated with Handel, dating from 1740, is pitched at A = 422.5 Hz, while a later one from 1780 is pitched at A = 409 Hz, almost a semitone lower. Nonetheless, there was a tendency towards the end of the 18th century for the frequency of the A above middle C to be in the range of 400 to 450 Hz.

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